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Patterson: Outside the Box

Outside the Box

A New Perspective on Operation
Windsor – The rationale behind the
attack on Carpiquet, 4 July 1944
David Patterson
“1 British Corps had ordered 3rd Canadian Division to take both the airfield and
Carpiquet village as a prelude to…a three-divisional assault directly on Caen.”1
“As a preliminary, the 3rd Canadian Division would attack on 3 July [sic] to secure
Carpiquet airfield and the approaches to Caen from the west.”2

O

peration Windsor never seemed to fit.
Why, one asks, would the 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division launch a major operation to
seize Carpiquet village and airfield a mere four
days before I British Corps started the much
larger three-division Operation Charnwood to
seize Caen? It seemed a distraction from the
main effort – a needless diversion of resources.
This view was reinforced by the standard
interpretations of the battles as reflected in
the two introductory quotations: Windsor as a
prelude to Charnwood. I had succumbed to what
I will call the black box syndrome. I looked only
within the analytical framework established by
countless historians from C.P. Stacey to Terry
Copp3 to John A. English, and, like them, saw
Operation Windsor as a precursor to Operation
Charnwood. It was upon visiting the battlefield
in 1997 and 1998 with the Canadian Battlefields
Foundation student study tour that I gained a
more complete understanding of the battle. For it
is only on the field itself that one can understand
that Operation Windsor had very little to do with
Operation Charnwood, and so much more to
do with Operations Epsom and Jupiter. Epsom
is familiar to any scholar of the campaign, but
Operation Jupiter, the 43rd Wessex Division
attack on Hill 112, is more obscure. It was the
ground that showed me the link which was
reinforced by a close review of the I British Corps
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Traditional interpretations of the 4 July
1944 battle for Carpiquet airfield, known as
Operation Windsor, have linked the battle with
Operation Charnwood, which followed the action
at Carpiquet four days later. [For the details of
Operation Windsor, see the shaded box on the
next page.] Windsor seems pointless, particularly
as the 8th Brigade captured the remaining
objectives of Operation Windsor with relative ease
on 8-9 July, the same objectives it was unable
to seize on 4 July. Why was the 4 July battle
necessary? Some interpretations imply it was a
wasted effort and that the entire area could have
waited until 8-9 July to be captured with little
effect on the greater battle for Caen. This is the
interpretation of Terry Copp and Robert Vogel
in Maple Leaf Route: Caen, for example. They
state that “It is not clear why General Crocker,
who was to command Carnwood, ordered the
3rd Canadian Division to capture Carpiquet
before the main attack.”4 Furthermore, although
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operations log. In this article I will try and show
that the traditional interpretation of Operation
Windsor has suffered from a “Canada-centric”
bias that fails to relate the ground to the battle
and assumes that all that precedes Charnwood
must be setting the stage for that battle. First
a review of the traditional interpretation is
required.
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acknowledging the efforts of the 43rd Wessex
Division that coincided with Operation Windsor,
they do not extend that link to the subsequent
assault by the West Country troops in Operation
Jupiter on 10 July. John A. English, for his part,
is very critical of the conduct of the battle and
in particular the failure of Major-General R.F.L.
Keller, commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division, to involve himself more closely in the
planning and execution of the assault. He does
not challenge the received wisdom that the
battle was a prelude to Charnwood, focused,
as his study is, on the nature of command in
the Canadian army in the Normandy campaign.
Michael Reynolds, in his hagiographic study of

the I SS Panzer Corps, is more concerned with
the stand of a small force of panzergrenadiers
against the firepower of the Allied army than in
any examination of the reasons for the operation:
“It was considered to be an essential prerequisite
to the capture of Caen itself,” Reynolds asserts. 5
Reginald Roy in his 1984 study of the Normandy
campaign maintains this link to Charnwood
but also introduces another motive, that of
acquiring the airfield at Carpiquet.6 This reason,
though valid on D-Day when Carpiquet airfield
was indeed an objective of the 3rd Canadian
Division, had by D+30 been largely overtaken by
the construction of airfields in France.7 Finally,
the recent study of the operations of the North
67
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ighth Brigade, strengthened
by the addition of the Royal
Winnipeg Rifles, was to attack
with the support of 21 regiments
of artillery, the tanks of the Fort
Garry Horse, and three squadrons
of Flails, Crocodiles and Petards
from the 79th Armoured Division.
Two squadrons of Typhoons and
HMS Rodney’s 16-inch guns were
used to soften up the target before
the attack. All of this additional
ﬁrepower made for an impressive
barrage, but it did not prevent the
Germans, who had every square
yard of the area plotted for artillery
fire, from wreaking havoc with
the infantry. The four battalions
had to cross more than a mile of
open country. When Allied artillery
opened up at 0500 hours on July
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4th the Germans instantly shelled
the startline and continued to rain
down high explosives on the men
who struggled forward through the
wheat ﬁelds.
The North Shore regimental
history calls Carpiquet “the
graveyard of the regiment”
because the battalion sustained
its heaviest casualties of the
war on July 4th. But the North
Shores were lucky compared to
the Royal Winnipeg Riﬂes. The
Winnipegs had suffered so many
losses on D-Day and in Putot that
their casualties on July 4th, which
were almost as high as the North
Shores, were just another horror
to be endured.
Reading the war diaries
and after-battle narratives of the

LAC PA 133977

Operation Windsor – an overview

A Sherman tank of the Fort Garry Horse at
Carpiquet, 8 July 1944.

survivors of Carpiquet is a chilling
experience. Major J.E. Anderson
of the North Shores spoke for
everyone when he wrote,
I am sure that at some time
during the attack every man
felt he could not go on. Men
were being killed or wounded
on all sides and the advance
seemed pointless as well as
hopeless. I never realised until
the attack on Carpiquet how
far discipline, pride of unit, and
above all, pride in oneself and
family, can carry a man even
when each step forward meant
possible death.

The men of the assault
regiments did keep going forward.
The North Shores and the
Chaudières occupied Carpiquet
village and dug in. They were
joined by the Queen’s Own Riﬂes,
who were supposed to press on
Carpiquet village and airﬁeld photographed
one day after Operation “Windsor.” Fires
still burn in the village and the damage
caused by the attack is readily visible. The
south hangars were the objective of the
Royal Winnipeg Riﬂes. Le Régiment de
la Chaudière captured the north hangars
while the North Shore (New Brunswick)
Regiment secured the village. The Queen’s
Own Riﬂes, in reserve, joined the North
Shores with the intention of advancing to
the control buildings, but this attack was
called off.
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the south edge of Carpiquet,
were counterattacked by German
infantry and Panther tanks. Enemy
ﬁre was so intense that they could
not establish a mineﬁeld in front

of their position. Carpiquet had
become a “true inferno,” but 8th
Brigade held on for four days until
“Charnwood” forced the Germans
to withdraw.

LAC PA 116513

to the airport control buildings.
But the Royal Winnipeg Rifles
had been unable to capture
their objectives, the hangars on
the south side of the runways.
Here the Germans had waited in
concrete pillboxes to add heavy
machine gun ﬁre to the torrent
of mortar and artillery shells. A
second attack with tanks and
ﬂame-throwing Crocodiles failed
to dislodge the stubborn, young
SS troops and both the Queen’s
Own and Winnipeg attacks were
cancelled.
For the troops in Carpiquet
the ﬁghting could not be called off.
Exposed in their ﬁnger-like salient
they were subjected to continuous
ﬁre from a German mortar brigade
which was attached to the 12th
SS. The Chaudières, defending
Canadian troops examine a German bunker
on the airﬁeld at Carpiquet, 12 July 1944.
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Above left: Two Churchill tanks from the British 31st Tank Brigade advance south of Norrey-en-Bessin on 27 June 1944
during Operation Epsom. Above right: Troops from the British 49th West Riding Division move through Fontenay-lePesnel on 25 June 1944 during Operation Martlett, a small attack designed to clear the startline for Epsom.

Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment by Marc Milner
is the first to explicitly make the link between
the southern hangers and escarpment with the
British operations that were conducted to the
south.8

For 3rd Canadian Division Operation
Windsor involved the greater part of the combat
power available to Major-General Keller at that
time. Four of his nine infantry battalions and two
of three armoured regiments were committed as
well as flail tanks and flamethrowers from 79th
Armoured Division. The largest fireplan executed
thus far in the Normandy Campaign supported
the assault. Fighter-bombers, given an easily
discernable target in the airfield and environs,
supported the attack along with over 750 guns
of the Royal and Royal Canadian Artillery.10 The
monitors HMS Rodney and Roberts weighed
in with their six 16-inch and two 15-inch guns
respectively, joined as well by the nine 6-inch
guns of the cruiser HMS Belfast. Some have
criticized Major-General Keller for not being more

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008

The battle for Carpiquet was a major event for
the 3rd Canadian Division and the first brigadesized engagement since le Mesnil-Patry almost
a month previous. The division, in constant
action since D-Day, had held the line between
the northern suburbs of Caen and the corps
boundary near Putot-en-Bessin. The storms of 18
June that wrecked the Mulberry harbours9 and
slowed Allied operations also delayed the start
of Operation Epsom, the British drive over the
Odon River. The initial assault across the Odon
was intended to seize Hill 112 and then drive
southwest to cross the Orne River valley. The
attack, launched on 25 June, saw the summit of
Hill 112 change hands several times as elements
of the 15th Scottish Infantry and the 11th British

Armoured Divisions battled the II SS Panzer
Corps. This formation of two divisions, direct
from the Eastern Front, was drawn into the battle
to seal off the British penetration.
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Major-General R.F.L. Keller (left), commander
of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, has been
roundly criticized for his conduct during
Operation Windsor, starting with comments
by his corps commander, Lieutenant-General
John Crocker (right).

south and west of Caen amongst which
the VIII Corps attack west of Caen,
known as Operation Epsom, was
critical. Preliminary to that attack were
several supporting assaults planned by
XXX Corps and I Corps both east and
west of Caen. These operations were as
follows:
involved in the conduct of this battle. Starting
with Lieutenant-General John Crocker, GOC
I (British) Corps, critics have attacked MajorGeneral Keller’s lack of grip on the battle and
his devolution of control of such a large battle
to a small brigade staff.11 The detailed conduct
of the battle is outside the scope of this article
but the result had clear implications for the
British to the southwest. The partial success at
Carpiquet, the seizure of the village and northern
control buildings, but not the southern control
buildings along the crest, delayed the start of the
43rd Wessex Division offensive. Brigadier (later
Major-General) H. Essame, commander of 214th
Brigade of the 43rd Division, and divisional
historian, summed up the problem from his
perspective:

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2008

Until the hangers at the south-west corner of
the aerodrome at Carpiquet were captured, the
whole area lay in full enemy view. The Canadian
advance on the 9th put an end to observation
from the north.12

This view is echoed in a more recent study of
the Hill 112 battlefield: “Operation Jupiter was
effectively ‘on call’ as it was predicated on the
capture of Carpiquet airfield.”13 On 10 July, one
day after the Canadians had cleared the southern
control buildings and escarpment, Operation
Jupiter was launched with four brigades
assaulting the eastern slopes of Hill 112. The
larger battle of Caen that still raged through 9-10
July and the Canadian involvement therein have
obscured the link to Jupiter. So from where then
did Operation Windsor originate?
Operation Windsor grew out of the series of
Second Army plans for expanding the bridgehead

•

Operation Perth – a 51st Highland Division
operation to expand the bridgehead to the
west and attract German attention to that
flank;

•

Operation Aberlour – a 3rd British Division
operation, with 9th Canadian Infantry
Brigade under command, to clear the salient
north of Caen;

•

Operation Ottawa – a 3rd Canadian Division
operation to capture Carpiquet village; and

•

Operation Martlet – a 49th West Riding
Division operation that cleared the start
line for 8 Corps west of Caen in the area of
Rauray.14

All these operations were planned in the
period 20-26 June and resulted from General
Montgomery’s desire to avoid a frontal assault on
Caen. The lack of potential for expansion to the
east and the limited success of Epsom resulted
in the final Operation Charnwood plan that saw I
Corps launch three divisions directly at Caen on 8
July. Operation Windsor flowed from these earlier
operations and was clearly linked more to them
than to the ultimate assault on Caen. Windsor,
in its earlier incarnations, first appeared in
relation to the British offensive on the Odon
when Operation Aberlour was proposed as a 3rd
British Division operation to clear the right flank
of the VIII Corps advance. Operation Aberlour
was clearly a supporting attack for Epsom as it
was ordered on 26 June, only one day after the
start of Epsom15 and long before Montgomery
issued orders for Operation Charnwood. In
the original plan Operation Ottawa was also a
71
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supporting attack for Operation Epsom, as it
would protect the left flank of the British advance
by clearing Carpiquet village. At this point the
VIII Corps attack to the west of Caen was still
the main effort and the Canadian attack on
Carpiquet must be seen in this light. Operation
Aberlour and the subsequent Operation Ottawa
were successively postponed as the prospects for
the complete success of Epsom waned. They were
both eventually called off completely by 28 June.16
Operation Windsor, as the renamed Operation
Ottawa was called, was revived in a more “virile”
form by I (British) Corps on 1 July.17 This still
predated the order for Operation Charnwood
received by 3rd Canadian Division on 5 July.18
To further sever the link between Windsor and
Charnwood, an explicit order to 3rd Canadian
Division by I (British) Corps admonished Keller
not to exploit to the north (towards Caen) if doing
so would endanger the objectives of Windsor.19
The objectives of Operation Windsor, the high
ground to the south of the airfield and the airfield
and village itself, were more important to I British
Corps than any benefit that might be accrued by
the capture of Caen. If the capture of Carpiquet
was indeed a preliminary to the subsequent
seizure of Caen then any exploitation to north
would have aided that effort. The remounting of
Windsor must also be examined in the context

of the bitter struggle to seize Hill 112. The initial
assault by 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured
Divisions had been reinforced by the arrival of the
43rd Wessex Division. Their attack was focused
more to the eastern end of the hill feature and
the heights on the southern edge of the Carpiquet
airfield became an even more important vantage
point for German observers.
While the study of the documents related to
Operation Windsor leads to the conclusions I
have drawn, a far simpler, though perhaps more
expensive method is available: walk the ground.
A visit to the Carpiquet battlefield, still in use as
a commercial short-haul airport, and a careful
study of the ground should lead the visitor to
same conclusions reached by Major-General
Essame in 1952. The key to success at Carpiquet
was the seizure of the southern control buildings,
and more importantly the clearing of the crest
that dominates the ground to the south. A walk
along that crest in 1998 with Terry Copp and the
Canadian Battlefields Foundation student study
tour brought this home in the way no text or map
could. The southern crest dominates the ground
to its south, across the Odon valley to crest of Hill
112. It was along this valley that the 5th Battalion,
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry advanced with
the intent of seizing Verson in concert with the 4
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July attack. That attack, timed to take advantage
of Operation Windsor, must not obscure the
link with the advance planned, in a completely
different direction, for Operation Jupiter. Further
to the south of Verson the start line and path of
advance of the 10 July Operation Jupiter attack
can be seen clearly. Marc Milner always told
the students of the tours he led to Normandy
to consider the ground a primary source when
studying military history. Nowhere is this more
clear than at Carpiquet where the contours on
the map and distance from the southern crest
to Hill 112 can be deceiving. A powerful set of
binoculars and a good map were all that any
German artillery observer would have needed to
wreck havoc with any British attempt to drive up
the northern slope of Hill 112.

simple chronological analysis of events is not
enough – if Windsor preceded Charnwood then
Windsor must be a lead in to Charnwood. Rather
we should expand the “black box” and look at the
impact of Canadian operations on the activities
of other formations. Literally getting another
point of view, by walking the southern crest of
Carpiquet airfield in this example, helps put the
decisions and actions of Canadian commanders
and soldiers in better perspective.

The operations of the 3rd Canadian Division
have been examined and re-examined almost
since they occurred. Some say that it has been
studied to death and that Stacey wrote the
definitive account, so why continue to rake
the coals of Normandy? The answer lies in
the evolution of thought about this relatively
minor battle in the grand campaign. Carpiquet
teaches us to look beyond the bounds of national
historiography and examine the context of
Canadian action within the Allied coalition. A

3.
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Day

British Sector

American Sector

D-Day

1 ELS

2 ELS

D+3

1 RRS

D+4

2 RRS

2 RRS

D+8

5 ALGs including
improved RRS

5 ALGs including
improved RRS

D+14

10 airﬁelds

8 airﬁelds

D+25

15 airﬁelds

12 airﬁelds

8.

9.

10.

ALG - Advanced Landing Ground; ELS - Emergency Landing Strip
RRS - Refuelling and Rearming Strip

In both the British and American sectors, construction
was delayed by the tactical situation. The cumulative
comparison between the planned and actual completion
is as shown below:
Day
D-Day

British Sector
Planned

Completed

1 ELS (pm)

D+1

American Sector
Planned

Completed

2 ELS

1 ELS

1 RRS
(untracked)

1 RRS
(untracked)

D+4

2 RRS
(1 tracked)
(1 untracked)

2 RRS
(untracked)

2 RRS
(untracked)

15.
2 RRS
(untracked)

2 RRS
(1 tracked)
(1 untracked)

D+6

16.
17.
18.

2 ALGs

D+7

5 ALGs

5 ALGs

D+9

3 ALGs

D+10

4 ALGs

D+11

5 ALGs

19.

4 ALGs

D+12
10 airﬁelds

8 airﬁelds

D+16

6 airﬁelds

D+17

7 airﬁelds

D+18

8 airﬁelds

D+19

9 airﬁelds

D+21

10 airﬁelds

D+23

6 airﬁelds

D+24

7 airﬁelds

D+25

14.

2 ELS

D+3

D+14

13.

1 ELS

D+2

D+8

11.
12.

15 airﬁelds

10 airﬁelds

12 airﬁelds
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8 airﬁelds

Royal Engineers Battlefield Tour: Normandy to the
Seine; Chief Engineer of the Army, August 1946; pp.4748
Comment: By 1 July two-thirds of airfield requirements
had been met in both the British and American sectors.
The immediate pressure to capture Carpiquet airfield to
use it as an airfield was no more.
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